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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Eric James Scott appeals from the district court's order affirming the 
judgment of conviction entered upon the magistrate court's finding that Scott was 
guilty of criminal contempt. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Eric Scott is an Idaho attorney who represented a criminal defendant. 
(See R., pp.470-471.) In the course of the criminal proceedings, the magistrate 
court denied Scott's motions to suppress evidence and to dismiss the charges. 
(Id.) Scott responded with a motion to withdraw from representation of his client. 
(State's Exhibit 1.) In this motion, Scott continued to argue the merits of his 
motions to suppress and dismiss, and expressed his displeasure with the 
Honorable Thomas P. Watkins, the presiding magistrate court judge. (Id.) The 
motion read, in part: 
The Court's errors in this case were so inexplicable and so 
great in number that Counsel has formed the belief that this Court 
is 
(a) lazy; 
(b) incompetent; 
(c) biased; 
(d) prejudiced; or 
[( e )] all or some of the above. 
With all due respect, Counsel simply cannot escape this 
·· belief. There is no explanation for the Court's "finding" of a "fact" 
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that did not exist. It would be understandable if this Court 
overlooked a fact, but this Court made up a fact. It just so happens 
that this Court made up facts to the advantage of his former 
employer, the Boise City Prosecutor's Office. Therefore, this Court 
is either biased toward them, prejudiced against Counsel, too lazy 
to actually listen to the recording of the relevant interview, or too 
incompetent to reach the correct conclusion from the facts. 
Therefore, Counsel lacks faith in this Court's ability to objectively 
and competently serve as a fact-finder in this case. 
For the reasons set forth above, Counsel also has no faith in 
this Court's ability to competently and objectively interpret the law in 
this case. The Court's stunningly nonsensical statement of the 
"test" for determining custody speaks for itself. The Court also did 
not even understand the rather simple ordinance, and then 
ironically called into question Counsel's legal abilities. This Court 
was not impressed with Counsel's legal skills, but suffice to say that 
Counsel shares a similar opinion of this Court's abilities to interpret 
the law and find facts. 
Due to Counsel's inability to maintain the requisite level of 
respect for this Court, Counsel feels that it would be in his client's 
best interests to withdraw from his matter. 
(State's Exhibit 1, pp.6-7 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).) Scott 
apparently exercised restraint in composing this version of the motion, as he also 
informed the court that "[p]rior to writing this Memorandum, Counsel drafted a 15-
page intense, scathing rebuke of this Court's Motion to Dismiss/in Limine" that he 
did not submit. (Id., p.2.) 
At the conclusion of the hearing on Scott's motion to withdraw, Judge 
Watkins, citing I.R.C.P. 75(c)(1 ), initiated a nonsummary criminal contempt 
charge against Scott. (R., pp.6-7.) The written complaint alleged that the 
statements in Scott's motion to withdraw constituted "disorderly, contemptuous or 
insolent behavior towards a judge and/or by willful neglect or violation of Rule 
8.2, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct," and were "libelous and serve[d] no 
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purpose other than to degrade the court and bring it into the contempt of the 
people." (Id.) Judge Watkins and seven other Ada County magistrates 
disqualified themselves from the contempt proceedings. (R., p.15.) The court 
appointed the Ada County Prosecutor's Office to represent the plaintiff/petitioner. 
(R., p.38.) 
After briefing and a court trial, the magistrate court found Scott guilty of 
contempt. (R., pp.87-92, 100-178; 10/7/11 Tr., p.7, L.2 - p.98, L.19.) The court 
imposed a fine, five days in jail (with three days suspended), and placed Scott on 
unsupervised probation for six months. (R., pp.158-160.) As a condition of 
probation, the court required Scott to perform 60 hours pro bona work, complete 
3 hours of ethics CLE credits, and write a letter of apology to Judge Watkins. 
(Id.) In its intermediate appellate capacity, the district court affirmed Scott's 
contempt conviction. (R., pp.470-491.) Scott then timely appealed to the Idaho 
Supreme Court. (R, pp.494-498.) 
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ISSUES 
Scott states the issues on appeal as: 
A. Whether the lower courts acquired jurisdiction without an 
initiating affidavit; 
B. Whether the Written Charge is jurisdictionally defective or 
denied Defendant notice; 
C. Whether the First Amendment precludes punishment for the 
speech at issue; 
D. Whether it was error to affirm on a different legal basis than 
the conviction's basis; 
E. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction 
under I.C. § 7-601-1; 
F. Whether Defendant should be awarded attorney fees on 
appeal and/or below. 
(Appellant's brief, p.6.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issues on appeal as: 
1. Has Scott failed to show that the magistrate court erred by declining to 
supply an affidavit with its contempt complaint? 
2. Has Scott failed to show any jurisdictional defect in the charging 
document? 
3. Has Scott failed to show that his contempt conviction is precluded by the 
First Amendment? 
4. Has Scott failed to show that his conviction was based on some improper 
substantive basis? 
5. Has Scott failed to show that the evidence presented was insufficient to 
support his conviction, or that the conduct as alleged did not constitute 
contempt? 
6. Has Scott failed to show that he is entitled to attorney's fees? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Scott Has Failed To Show That The Magistrate Court Erred By Declining To 
Supply An Affidavit With Its Contempt Complaint 
A Introduction 
Scott contends that the magistrate court erred by failing to supply an 
affidavit with its contempt complaint. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-14.) Scott's claim 
fails because Judge Watkins had personal knowledge of the existence and 
content of Scott's motion to withdraw, and because the motion was maintained 
within the court's case file. Therefore, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 75(c), no affidavit was 
required. 
B. The Magistrate Court Was Not Required To Supply An Affidavit With Its 
Contempt Complaint 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 75(c) provides that a judge may initiate 
nonsummary contempt proceedings by issuing and serving a written charge of 
contempt. The written charge "must be supported by an affidavit unless the 
facts recited in it are based upon the judge's personal knowledge and/or upon 
information from the court file contained in documents prepared by court 
personnel." (Id.) 
Here, as the magistrate and district court correctly concluded (R., pp.176-
177, 474-477), Judge Watkins was not required to support his contempt 
complaint with an affidavit because he had personal knowledge of Scott's 
relevant conduct. Scott's contemptuous actions were entirely contained in his 
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motion to withdraw, which he signed and filed in a case over which Judge 
Watkins presided. (R., pp.6-7.) 
Judge Watkins did not rely on any factual information extrinsic to Scott's 
motion or any statements made by others in initiating the contempt charge. The 
charge was not based on the violation of a court order, or on some other out-of-
court activity that would necessitate additional supporting facts. Instead, Scott's 
"disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior towards a judge" was self-evident 
from the motion itself, and the act of contempt was completed upon Scott's filing 
of the motion. On appeal, Scott has not attempted to suggest what a supporting 
affidavit in this case could even allege to further support the sole factual issue in 
this case - whether Scott authored and filed the motion to withdraw. The state 
submits that pursuant to I.R.C.P. 75(c), a judge has "personal knowledge" of the 
existence and contents of all filings made in cases over which he or she 
presides. 
Scott argues that the "personal knowledge" affidavit requirement of 
I.R.C.P. 75(c) required Judge Watkins to provide an affidavit unless the contempt 
also occurred within the "immediate view and presence of the court." (Appellant's 
brief, pp.6-14.) Scott essentially contends that Judge Watkins lacked personal 
knowledge of the facts underlying the contempt charge because Scott did not file 
the motion to withdraw in Judge Watkins' presence. (Id. (quoting Harkness v. 
Hyde, 31 Idaho 784, 176 P. 885, 886 (1918), ("when the contempt is not 
committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or judge, no 
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jurisdiction is acquired by the court until the affidavit required by the statute is 
presented.")). 
Scott's contention fails. The proposition he cites from Harkness is based 
upon the no-longer-controlling Idaho Rev. Codes. Harkness, 31 Idaho at_, 
176 P. at 886 (citing Idaho Rev. Codes, sec. § 5157 (1908)). Under modern 
applicable procedural contempt law, while a judge may only initiate a summary1 
contempt proceeding if "[t]he conduct occurs in open court in the immediate 
presence of the judge," I.R.C.P. 75(b), no such requirement exists where, as in 
this case, a judge initiates nonsummary contempt proceedings without a 
supporting affidavit pursuant to I.R.C.P. 75(c). Contrary to Scott's contention, the 
"personal knowledge" affidavit requirement of I.R.C.P. 75(c) is not equivalent to 
the "immediate presence" summary contempt requirement of I.R.C.P. 75(b). The 
Idaho Supreme Court utilized different terminology to express these different 
requirements in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Even if the contempt allegations were not based upon Judge Watkins' 
"personal knowledge," no affidavit was required because the allegations were 
based entirely "upon information from the court file contained in documents 
1 A summary contempt proceeding is one in which the contemnor is not given 
prior notice of the charge of contempt or an opportunity for a hearing to 
determine whether the charges are true. I.R.C.P. 75(a)(4). A judge may only 
summarily impose a contempt sanction if the contempt is committed in open 
court in the immediate presence of the judge. I.R.C.P. 75(b). A nonsummary 
contempt proceeding, such as the one in this case, is one in which the 
contemnor is given prior notice of the contempt charge and an opportunity for a 
hearing. I.R.C.P. 75(a)(5). 
7 
prepared by court personnel," i.e., the filed motion to withdraw signed by Scott. 
On appeal, Scott appears to contend that this exception to the affidavit 
requirement does not apply because court personnel did not authorthe motion to 
withdraw that was the subject of the contempt complaint. (Appellant's brief, p.8 
n.6.) In other words, Scott would define the term "prepared," as it is utilized in 
I.R.C.P. 75(c), to require court personnel to have actually authored or created the 
relevant document in order for the affidavit exception to apply. 
However, it is more likely that, in this context, the term "prepared" refers 
simply to court personnel's role in organizing and maintaining a court file in a 
pending case. If, as in this case, contempt allegations are entirely supported by 
documents in the court file prepared and maintained by court personnel, no 
supporting affidavit is necessary. This view of the meaning of the term 
"prepared" is supported by dictionary definitions. Merriam-Webster's Collegiate 
Dictionary (11 th Edition) (defining "prepare" as "to make ready beforehand for 
some purpose, use, or activity"); Black's Law Dictionary (6th Edition, 1990) 
(defining "prepare" as "[t]o provide with necessary means; to make ready; to 
provide with what is appropriate or necessary"). 
Judge Watkins was personally aware of the motion to withdraw, signed by 
Scott, which contained contemptuous language. The motion to withdraw was 
also a part of the court file prepared and maintained by court personnel. This 
satisfied the affidavit exception of I.R.C.P. 75(c). Scott has therefore failed to 
show that the magistrate court erred. 
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11. 
Scott Has Failed To Identify Any Jurisdictional Defect In The Charging Document 
A. Introduction 
Scott contends that the contempt complaint was jurisdictionally defective.2 
(Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) Specifically, Scott claims that his conviction is void 
because the complaint failed to adequately allege contempt, and because it 
failed to allege that the contemptuous conduct occurred in Idaho. (Id.) Scott's 
argument fails because the complaint alleged specific facts that constitute 
contempt under the common law. Further, the court's territorial and personal 
jurisdiction is apparent from the complaint, which alleged that Scott filed a motion 
with contemptuous content in an Idaho criminal case. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a charging document conforms to the requirements of the law is 
a question over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Jones, 
140 Idaho 755, 757, 101 P.3d 699, 701 (2004); State v. Robran, 119 Idaho 285, 
287, 805 P.2d 491, 493 (Ct. App. 1991 ). 
2 Scott also contends that his due process notice rights were violated. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) Due process requires that the alleged contemnor 
be given notice of the exact charges against him. Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 
114 Idaho 817,838,761 P.2d 1169, 1190 (1988). For the same reasons as 
discussed in Section II that the charging complaint properly alleged contempt, the 
complaint also provided Scott notice of the contempt charge against him. 
Because of the inherent and common law nature of a trial court's contempt 
power, the type and scope of the contempt alleged was, in fact, defined by the 
court in the complaint, and not by any statute. Scott was not punished for any 
other conduct beyond what was alleged in the complaint. 
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C. The Contempt Complaint Conferred Jurisdiction Upon The Magistrate 
Court By Alleging Scott Committed Acts Which Constitute Contempt 
A charging document alleging contempt must "recite on its face the 
substantive facts which constitute, or might constitute, a contempt on the part of 
the accused." Sandelin v. Quinlan, 94 Idaho 858, 861, 499 P.2d 557, 560 
(1972). Otherwise, the court is without jurisdiction to commence the contempt 
proceedings. kl 
Idaho Code § 7-601 defines certain acts and omissions relating to court 
proceedings which constitute contempt of court. However, because the Idaho 
Code does not circumscribe the inherent judicial contempt power, see Marks v. 
Vehlow, 105 Idaho 560, 566, 671 P.2d 473, 479 (1983), I.C. § 7-601 is not an 
exhaustive list of the types of conduct which may constitute contempt. Idaho 
Code§§ 7-601 through 7-614 provide guidance as to contempt proceedings, but 
they are not the substantive source of a trial court's contempt power. See 
Vehlow, 105 Idaho at 566, 671 P.2d at 479. Instead, the broad scope of a trial 
court's contempt power is substantively defined by the common law, and 
appellate opinions interpreting the common law. 
Misconduct by an attorney which reflects improperly on the dignity or 
authority of the court, or which obstructs or tends to obstruct, prevent, or 
embarrass the administration of justice, constitutes contempt. See Pounders v. 
Watson, 521 U.S. 982, 987-988 (1997). Insulting language directed towards the 
court may constitute contempt. See U.S. v. Schiffer, 351 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1965). 
For example, remarks by attorneys have been held contemptuous where: in 
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expressing his displeasure with a trial-court setting, an attorney used such 
language as "this is ridiculous," "I have never seen anything like this circus," "this 
is a travesty," and "this is a farce," In re Cohen, 370 F. Supp. 1166 (S.D. N.Y. 
1973); following an adverse ruling, an attorney stated that "this court obviously 
doesn't want to apply the law," In re Buckley, 514 P.2d 1201 (Cal. 1973); an 
attorney stated "you've made enough bad law on this case, Judge," Werlin v. 
Goldberg, 129 A.D.2d 334 (N.Y. 2D Dep't 1987); and where an attorney asserted 
in court that a ruling was biased, that the judge made no sense and was 
deliberately attempting to favor opposing counsel, and concluded his remarks by 
turning his back on the court and addressing the news media in a loud voice. 
Paul v. Pleasants, 551 F.2d 575 (4th Cir. 1977). In each of these cases, the 
attorney's comments reflected improperly on the dignity or authority of the court, 
went beyond the bounds of vigorous advocacy, and served no legitimate purpose 
in the proceedings or in the representation of any client. 
In this case, the complaint alleged: 
Pursuant to Rule 75(c)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, this court initiates a contempt proceeding against Eric 
Scott, counsel of record for Defendant John T. Lorimor, for 
disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior towards a judge 
and/or by willful neglect or violation of Rule 8.2, Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 
CHARGE: That on August 12, 2011, Mr. Scott filed a Motion to 
Withdraw as attorney of record for Defendant Lorimor, and that the 
motion cited the following grounds for withdrawal: that this court 
was too lazy to listen to an exhibit before making its ruling; that the 
court was too incompetent to reach the correct legal conclusion; 
that the court made up facts to support its ruling; that this court 
made up this fact so that its former employer would benefit, and; 
the court was prejudiced against Mr. Scott. That these statements 
11 
concerning the qualifications or integrity of the court are libelous 
and serve no purpose other than to degrade this court and bring it 
into the contempt of the people. 
(R., pp.6-7.) 
This complaint conferred jurisdiction on the magistrate court because it 
alleged substantive facts that constitute, or might constitute, contempt. While 
similar conduct has not been the subject of contempt proceedings analyzed in 
Idaho appellate cases, the facts alleged in the complaint are well within the realm 
of how contempt has been defined by other jurisdictions. 
Scott's conduct was especially egregious and contemptuous because the 
relevant statements were not made in the heat of trial, or in the context of 
zealous representation of his client, but in the form of a written motion, whose 
professed function was not to further his client's defense, but to remove himself 
from the proceedings. The magistrate court acted within its inherent power to to 
initiate contempt proceedings in response to this conduct. 
The charging complaint in this case alleged substantive facts which 
constitute, or might constitute, contempt. The complaint thus conferred 
jurisdiction upon the magistrate court to initiate contempt proceedings. 
D. The Magistrate Court Had Territorial Jurisdiction Over The Case And 
Personal Jurisdiction Over Scott 
When a prosecutor initiates a criminal charge, "the information, indictment, 
or complaint alleging an offense was committed within the state of Idaho confers 
subject matter jurisdiction upon the court." State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 228, 
12 
91 P.3d 1127, 1133 (2004) (citing State v. Slater, 71 Idaho 335, 338, 231 P.2d 
424,425 (1951)). 
However, Scott has cited no authority standing for his contention that a 
judge initiating a contempt proceeding pursuant to its inherent and constitutional 
power is required to similarly include an express statement of territorial 
jurisdiction in a contempt charging document. Such territorial jurisdiction, and 
personal jurisdiction over the contemnor3 will often, as is the case here, be 
readily apparent from the nature of the contempt allegations. 
The complaint in this case alleged that Scott engaged in "disorderly, 
contemptuous or insolent behavior" in the context of a motion to withdraw from 
the representation of a defendant in an Idaho criminal case. (R., pp.6-7.) The 
written complaint contained the case number associated with that criminal case. 
(Id.) The court had personal jurisdiction over Scott and territorial jurisdiction 
over the case by virtue of Scott's participation in an Idaho criminal proceeding. 
Scott has not shown that more is required to confer personal or territorial 
jurisdiction in a contempt proceeding. His claim that the complaint was 
jurisdictionally defective therefore fails. 
3 A court must have personal jurisdiction over an individual it punishes for 
contempt. See In re Lavin, 59 Idaho 197, 81 P.2d 727 (1938). In Lavin, the 
Idaho Supreme Court Court retained jurisdiction of a contempt proceeding 
involving a non-resident attorney until the attorney could be served with the 
contempt charge within Idaho's borders. 
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111. 
Scott Has Failed To Show That His Contempt Conviction Is Precluded By The 
First Amendment 
A. Introduction 
Scott contends that the content of his motion to withdraw was protected by 
the First Amendment, and that the magistrate court was precluded from finding 
him in criminal contempt for that conduct. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-41.) 
Specifically, Scott likens the statements in his motion to criticism of the judiciary 
which is subject to broad protections. (Id.) While the First Amendment broadly 
protects speech critical of judges in many contexts, the First Amendment does 
not preclude courts from utilizing their contempt powers to punish attorneys who 
engage in the type of derogatory and insulting conduct engaged in by Scott in 
this case. 
8. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P .3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001 ). 
C. The First Amendment Did Not Preclude The Magistrate Court From 
Finding Scott In Contempt 
The Idaho Supreme Court recently discussed the limited First Amendment 
protections afforded to attorneys who are engaged in court proceedings: 
14 
It is well established that attorneys acting as advocates in a 
judicial proceeding do not enjoy the same First Amendment 
protections as the general public, both due to their membership in a 
specialized profession and their status as officers of the court. See 
[Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1066 (1991)] 
("Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions .... ") 
(quoting In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 116 N.E. 782, 783 (1917)). See 
also In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622, 646-47, 79 S.Ct. 1376, 1388, 3 
L.Ed.2d 1473, 1488-89 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
("Obedience to ethical precepts may require abstention from what 
in other circumstances might be constitutionally protected 
speech."); Haeberle v. Tex. lnt'l Airlines, 739 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th 
Cir. 1984) ("By voluntarily assuming the special status of trial 
participants and officers of the court, parties and their attorneys 
subject themselves to greater restraints on their communications 
than might constitutionally be applied to the general public."); 
Journal Pub'g Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1236 (10th 
Cir.1986). 
Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 46, 253 P.3d 716, 720 (2011). 
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized that attorneys 
representing clients in pending cases have fewer First Amendment protections in 
the context of those representations: 
[T]he speech of lawyers representing clients in pending 
cases may be regulated under a less demanding standard than that 
established for regulation of the press in Nebraska Press Assn. v. 
Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976), and 
the cases which preceded it. Lawyers representing clients in 
pending cases are key participants in the criminal justice system, 
and the State may demand some adherence to the precepts of that 
system in regulating their speech as well as their conduct. 
Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1031; see also In re Buckley. 514 P.2d 1201, 1212 n.21 
(Cal. 1973) ("Unlike a newspaper, a courtroom is not a proper forum for free-
wheeling exchange of ideas. An attorney's freedom of speech in this setting 
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must be tempered to insure that courts of law accomplish that for which they 
were created - dispensing justice in a reasonable, efficient and fair manner."). 
As Scott correctly notes on appeal, attorneys and other individuals do 
enjoy First Amendment rights to criticize judges under many circumstances. 
Non-lawyers have broad First Amendment rights to criticize judges regarding 
pending court cases unless a "clear and present danger" from such comments 
can be established. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263 (1941 ); Craig v. 
Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1948). Lawyers may not be criminally punished for out-of-
court criticism of judges made through the media unless the statements are 
made "with [a] high degree of awareness of [the statement's] probable falsity." 
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964). Attorneys representing clients in 
pending legal matters have broad First Amendment rights to raise relevant and 
colorable claims in a court proceeding, Legal Services Corp. v. Velazguez, 531 
U.S. 533 (2001), which may include motions to disqualify a judge that contain 
allegations of bias or other judicial criticisms. See Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 
(1965). 
However, each of these and other cases relied on by Scott, in which lofty 
standards must be met before a court may hold an individual in criminal contempt 
for speech directed at a judge, are factually distinguishable from the 
circumstances of this case. Scott has failed to show that these broad First 
Amendment protections exist where, as here, an attorney in an ongoing legal 
proceeding makes contemptuous statements in the context of that proceeding in 
a manner which does not further the attorney's representation of his client. 
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Therefore, the district court in this case correctly concluded that "the First 
Amendment provides no safe harbor for an attorney that would afford him the 
right to make disparaging and insulting remarks to a judge in a pleading filed with 
the court." (R., p.477.) 
In Garrison, a case relied on heavily by Scott, a district attorney held a 
press conference in which he criticized eight local judges with whom he had an 
ongoing dispute. kl He was subsequently charged and convicted of criminal 
defamation. kl In reversing Garrison's conviction, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the "New York Times Rule,"4 which prohibits public officials from 
bringing civil actions against those who criticize their official conduct unless they 
can show "actual malice," also so limited the state's power to impose criminal 
sanctions for criticism of the official conduct of public officials. kl 
If Scott wished to conduct a press conference or engage in any other type 
of public forum to express his criticisms and beliefs about Judge Watkins' 
competency and integrity, Garrison would preclude the state from punishing him 
criminally for those statements unless it could demonstrate actual malice. 
However, Garrison does not stand for the proposition that Scott enjoyed similar 
protections in his arguments made to the court in the context of an ongoing legal 
proceeding. As the United States Supreme Court noted in Gentile, restricting the 
speech of lawyers while they are involved in pending cases does not prohibit 
speech altogether but "merely postpones the attorneys' comments until after the 
trial." Gentile, 501 U.S. at 1031-1032. 
4 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
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For similar reasons, Scott's reliance on the line of United States Supreme 
Court cases that he purports required the magistrate court to find an "imminent, 
not merely likely, threat to the administration of justice" (Appellant's brief, p.34), in 
order to find him in contempt for his conduct is misguided. Bridges, 314 U.S. 
252, and Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), are distinguishable from the 
factual scenario of this case. Bridges and Wood involved the government's 
punishment of out-of-court statements pertaining to pending litigation which were 
published in newspapers. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 258-259; Wood, 370 U.S. at 376. 
Scott has failed to show that the "actual malice," "imminent threat to the 
administration of justice," or some other enhanced First Amendment standard 
applies to contemptuous statements made in-court or in briefs filed by attorneys 
in ongoing legal proceedings. 
In re Little, 404 U.S. 553 (1972), which is also relied on by Scott, is 
likewise distinguishable. In Little, a case which did not reference the First 
Amendment or involve contemptuous attorney conduct, the United States 
Supreme Court vacated a pro se defendant's summary contempt conviction. kl 
The Court, expressly limiting its holding to the "context of this case," simply 
determined that Little's conduct did not constitute contempt. kl The Court 
determined that Little was entitled to allege judicial bias so that he could conduct 
his defense and potentially move to disqualify the judge. kl at 553-556 (citing 
Holt, 381 U.S. at 555-556); see also In re Buckley, 514 P.2d 1201, 1211-1212 
(Cal. 1973) ("We read Holt as merely affirming, upon constitutional grounds of 
due process, the settled rule that an attorney may not be summarily adjudged in 
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contempt for aggressive but respectful advocacy .... We do not think that Little, 
the holding of which was carefully limited to the particular facts of that case, was 
intended to broaden this time-honored rule in order to protect insulting and 
disrespectful argument that serves no purpose other than to vent an attorney's 
anger."). 
Scott additionally contends that that the very proscription of "disorderly, 
contemptuous or insolent behavior towards a judge" is viewpoint-based and 
unconstitutional, because it is directed at those who hold a negative view of 
judges. (Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.) In a common thread surrounding his First 
Amendment arguments, Scott attempts to characterize the statements in his 
motion to withdraw as simply criticisms and beliefs regarding the capabilities and 
integrity of Judge Watkins, and the criminal contempt judgment as simply 
punishment of these constitutionally protected criticisms. (See Appellant's brief, 
pp.15-41.) 
Scott's view misunderstands5 the nature of a court's inherent contempt 
power and why such conduct is contemptuous. In a case cited by the district 
court in affirming Scott's conviction, the Kentucky Supreme Court discussed the 
5 In the context of this misunderstanding, and his argument that the maintenance 
of societal respect for the judiciary is not a legitimate aim of a trial court's inherent 
contempt power, Scott also offers hyperbolic rhetoric: "if [Scott's] words were 
capable of inspiring the citizenry's widespread visceral contempt for the law, as 
[the magistrate court] so fears, than Justice Scalia's [dissents critical of majority 
opinions] would have resulted in universal American anarchy, or at least regime 
change, decades ago." (Appellant's brief, pp.27-28.) In this case, the 
magistrate court was not required to establish either the danger of universal 
American anarchy, or even widespread visceral contempt for the law - only that 
Scott's acts constituted contempt. 
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nature of contemptuous conduct directed at a judge, and held that comments 
made by a lawyer in his filed brief that a judge was a "lying incompetent asshole" 
were not protected by the First Amendment: 
Respondent appears to believe that truth or some concept 
akin to truth, such as accuracy or correctness, is a defense to the 
charge against him. In this respect he has totally missed the point. 
There can never be a justification for a lawyer to use such 
scurrilous language with respect to a judge in pleadings or in open 
court. The reason is not that the judge is of such delicate 
sensibilities as to be unable to withstand the comment, but rather 
that such language promotes disrespect for the law and for the 
judicial system. Officers of the court are obligated to uphold the 
dignity of the Court of Justice and, at a minimum, this requires them 
to refrain from the type of conduct at issue here. 
Kentucky Bar Association v. Waller, 929 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Ky. 1996). Whether 
the judge subject to the attorney's wrath in Waller was, by any objective 
measure, in fact, "incompetent," or even a "liar," was beside the point. The 
attorney had the First Amendment right to express those beliefs in any number of 
contexts, including publicly upon the conclusion of the proceedings. But as the 
court correctly recognized, such protections do not extend to contemptuous 
conduct made by licensed attorneys in the context of an ongoing legal 
proceeding. 
Similarly, while Scott maintained some First Amendment protections in the 
representation of his client, and broader First Amendment rights to express his 
opinions and beliefs about Judge Watkins through out-of-court statements made 
after his participation in the case had concluded, he was, as an officer of the 
court, at a minimum, required to refrain from insulting and derogatory conduct 
consisting of accusations or beliefs regarding Judge Watkins' competency and 
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integrity, particularly in a manner which in no way furthered the representation of 
his client. 
Scott has failed to show that his contemptuous statements made in 
pleadings in an ongoing legal proceeding in which he represented a party were 
subject to First Amendment protections sufficient to preclude his contempt 
conviction. He has therefore failed to show that the district court erred in 
rejecting his First Amendment challenge and affirming his contempt conviction. 
IV. 
Scott Has Failed To Show That His Contempt Conviction Was Based On Some 
Improper Substantive Basis 
A. Introduction 
Scott contends that his contempt conviction is void because the 
magistrate court erroneously identified I.R.C.P. 75 as the substantive source of 
its power to punish him for contempt, and that the district court erred by affirming 
his conviction on a different substantive basis, i.e., a definition of contempt 
contained in I.C. § 7-601-1. (Appellant's brief, pp.41-45.) Scott's contention fails 
because the substantive power of trial courts to find individuals in contempt is 
based on the court's inherent authority, the Idaho Constitution, and the common 
law, not the Idaho Code or Idaho Criminal Rules. No reference by the magistrate 
court or prosecutor the applicable procedural rules divested the court of its 
substantive contempt powers. 
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B. The Magistrate Court Properly Utilized Its Contempt Powers 
Trial courts are vested with the judicial power of contempt to vindicate 
their jurisdiction and proper function. Marks, 105 Idaho at 566, 671 P.2d at 479; 
State v. Abracadabra Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho 113, 119, 952 P.2d 1249, 1255 (Ct. 
App. 1998). In Idaho, this contempt power has its source in its inherent authority, 
Idaho Constitution art. V, § 2, and the common law, and not in any statute or rule 
State v. Doe, 149 Idaho 353, 360, 233 P.3d 1274, 1282 (2010); Abracadabra 
Bail Bonds, 131 Idaho at 119, 952 P.2d at 1255; Marks, 105 Idaho at 566, 671 
P.2d at 479; McDougall v. Sheridan, 23 Idaho 191, 222-223, 128 P. 954, 964-965 
(1913). This power can be regulated by the legislature, but it cannot be 
interfered with or abridged. Butler v. Goff, 130 Idaho 905, 908, 950 P.2d 1244, 
1247 (1997) (citing McDougall, 23 Idaho at 224, 128 P. at 965). 
As discussed supra, I.C. § 7-601 provides a non-exhaustive list of certain 
acts and omissions relating to court proceedings which constitute contempt of 
court. Idaho Code §§ 7-603 through 7-614 set forth specific penalties for 
contempt and procedures for contempt proceedings. Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 75 sets forth procedures for contempt proceedings brought in 
connection with civil lawsuits, or as separate proceedings. These statutes and 
rules provide guidance as to contempt proceedings, and examples of various 
types of actions and omissions that constitute contempt, but they are not the 
substantive source of a trial court's contempt power. See Vehlow, 105 Idaho 
560, 671 P.2d 473. 
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In this case, the magistrate court's contempt complaint identified the 
relevant Idaho procedural law it was applying in conjunction with its power to 
punish individuals for contempt. The complaint stated that the court was bringing 
the charge "[p]ursuant to Rule 75(c)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." 
(R., pp.6-7.) (Id.) The complaint also described the conduct giving rise to the 
contempt charge, and partially quoted one of the examples of contemptuous 
behavior codified in I.C. § 7-601 (1) - it alleged Scott engaged in "disorderly, 
contemptuous or insolent behavior toward a judge and/or by willful neglect." (Id.) 
The court also supported its allegation that Scott's conduct constituted contempt 
by citing the Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 8.2. (Id.) The complaint did not 
expressly reference the substantive inherent or constitutional source of the 
court's contempt power. (See id.) 
On appeal, Scott essentially contends that the magistrate court and district 
court incorrectly articulated the relevant contempt law. First, he contends that 
the contempt complaint is void because the magistrate court relied on I.R.C.P. 
75, a procedural rule, as the substantive source of its power to charge him with 
contempt. (Appellant's brief, pp.41-45.) Second, he contends that the district 
court erred by upholding the conviction on a different substantive basis, i.e., the 
conduct identified as contempt in I.C. § 7-601(1). (Id.) Scott's claims are 
unpersuasive for at least two reasons. 
First, the magistrate court did not, and could not, rely on I.R.C.P. 75 as a 
substantive basis of its contempt power, and any reference to I.R.C.P. 75 did not 
render the complaint or conviction void. On appeal, Scott points to various 
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citations to I.R.C.P. 75 made by the magistrate court and prosecutor in the 
course of the pleadings and trial testimony below, including statements in the 
judgment of conviction that Scott was "Charged with the following offense: 
Contempt [I.R.C.P.] 75", and the prosecutor's written closing argument stating 
that Scott was "clearly guilty of contempt under [1.R.C.P.] 75." (Appellant's brief, 
p.41.) 
While some of the terminology utilized by the magistrate court and 
prosecutor below was not technically precise, Scott has cited no authority or legal 
basis for his proposition that this imprecision somehow divested the trial court of 
its constitutional and common law power to find him in contempt, or rendered his 
conviction void. Nor has he cited any authority that would require a magistrate 
court to expressly identify its constitutional or inherent contempt power in the 
charging document. Regardless of the language utilized in these proceedings, 
the magistrate court's substantive power to bring the contempt proceeding came 
from the Idaho Constitution and from its inherent authority, and not from any 
other source. 
Scott attempts to equate the magistrate's and prosecutor's citations to the 
applicable procedural rules with the Idaho Supreme Court's well-established 
principle that a party seeking attorney's fees on appeal must cite to a substantive 
basis on which to request such fees, not merely the rule that provides the 
procedure for doing so. (Appellant's brief, p.42 (citing Commercial Ventures, Inc. 
v. Rx M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 219, 177 P.3d 955, 966 
(2008)). This comparison is misguided. A party has no inherent or constitutional 
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right to automatically receive fees on appeal, and an appellate court has no 
inherent or constitutional mandate to automatically order such fees. Instead, the 
relevant rights and authority regarding attorney's fees are created by the Idaho 
Appellate Rules, and a party must specifically request fees and cite the legal 
basis for them. See I.AR. 41. Scott has cited no corresponding legal principle 
that would require a court to expressly identify its inherent and constitutional 
substantive contempt power before it utilizes that power. 
Second, the district court did not affirm Scott's contempt conviction on an 
improper basis. Scott contends that after the magistrate court utilized I.R.C.P. 75 
as a substantive basis for the charge, the district court affirmed the conviction on 
another substantive basis, I.C. § 7-601(1). However, this is not the case. The 
district court utilized I.C. § 7-601, which contains examples of types of acts and 
omissions that constitute contempt, to support its conclusion that the conduct 
alleged in this case actually constituted contempt. (R., pp.470-490.) Any 
additional discussion or analysis utilizing I.C. § 7-601 was superfluous at worst 
and did not render Scott's conviction void. 
The magistrate court's contempt complaint against Scott was properly 
brought pursuant to its inherent and constitutional powers. Neither the lack of 
express reference to these powers in the complaint itself, nor any imprecise or 
superfluous reference to the procedural rules governing the proceedings divested 
the court of this power or render Scott's conviction void. 
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V. 
Scott Has Failed To Show That The Evidence Presented Was Insufficient To 
Support His Conviction For Criminal Contempt 
A. Introduction 
Scott contends that there was insufficient evidence that he committed 
contempt as defined in I.C. § 7-601 (1 ). (Appellant's brief, pp.41-45.) Scott's 
contention fails because the magistrate court was not required to find that Scott 
violated I.C. § 7-601(1), but only that Scott committed contempt as alleged in the 
complaint. Further, the record contains substantial evidence to support the 
factual allegations contained in the complaint. 
B. Standard Of Review 
A trial court's finding of contempt will not be overturned unless it is not 
supported by substantial evidence. In re Williams, 120 Idaho 473, 476, 817 P.2d 
139, 142 (1991). 
C. The Evidence Presented Was Sufficient To Support Scott's Contempt 
Conviction 
A defendant charged with nonsummary contempt is entitled to a trial at 
which the court must find that the contempt was proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt before it can impose a criminal penalty. I.R.C.P. 75U). 
As discussed in Section. I, the only pure factual finding the magistrate 
court was required to make in finding Scott guilty of contempt was that he willfully 
authored and filed the motion to withdraw. The court's other required analysis 
required a legal determination - whether the content of the motion constituted 
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contempt under the common law, in a manner consistent with the allegations in 
the complaint. In alleging that Scott's conduct constituted contempt, Judge 
Watkins quoted a portion of I.C. § 7-601 (1) in his complaint, and alleged that 
Scott engaged in "[d]isorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior towards the 
judge." (R., pp.6-7.) 
The evidence was sufficient to support the magistrate court's sole 
necessary factual finding that Scott authored and filed the motion. The motion, 
which was admitted into evidence at the contempt trial, contained Scott's 
signature. (State's Exhibit 1; 10/7/11 Tr., p.22, Ls.1-7.) At trial, Judge Watkins 
testified that at a previous hearing, Scott admitted to authoring the motion. 
(10/7/11 Tr., p.16, Ls.8-17.) 
On appeal, Scott contends that the petitioner/plaintiff failed to present 
evidence to support a finding that Scott committed contempt as defined by I.C. § 
7-601(1). (Appellant's brief, pp.41-45.) Specifically, Scott contends that the 
evidence did not support a finding that his behavior towards Judge Watkins 
"tend[ed] to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceedings," 
"while [Judge Watkins was] holding the court," (Appellant's brief, pp.42-45 
(quoting I.C. § 7-601(1).) However, this was not a required element of the 
contempt charge against Scott because Judge Watkins' complaint did not quote 
or otherwise allege the conduct described in this portion of I.C. 7-6010(1). (R., 
pp.6-7.) Nor was the complaint required to contain this specific allegation in 
order to allege contempt under the common law. As discussed in Section II, the 
allegations in the complaint described conduct which constituted, or might 
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constitute, contempt. The magistrate court was not required to prove additional 
allegations not contained in the complaint.6 
The state presented substantial evidence to support the allegations 
alleged in the magistrate court's contempt complaint sufficient to constitute 
contempt. Scott has thus failed to show that the district court erred in affirming 
his conviction. 
VI. 
Scott Is Not Entitled To Attorney's Fees 
Scott contends that he should have recovered attorney's fees below. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.45-46.) However, I.C. § 7-610 and I.R.C.P. 75(m) provide 
trial courts the discretionary power to award attorney's fees only to the prevailing 
parties of contempt proceedings. Because Scott was not the prevailing party 
below, he was not entitled to attorney's fees, even if he now prevails on appeal. 
See State v. Rice, 145 Idaho 554, 557, 181 P.3d 480, 483 (2008). 
6 The magistrate court also found that Scott's allegations regarding Judge 
Watkins' character and legal abilities were made "without foundation or factual 
basis." (R., p.170.) This finding was supported by substantial evidence. Scott 
was not even present at the hearing at which, he asserted, Judge Watkins "made 
up" a fact. (State's exhibit 2; Defendant's exhibit G.) Scott did not provide any 
foundation or supporting factual basis for his allegations against Judge Watkins 
other than those which were based on his disagreement with the outcome of his 
motions to suppress and dismiss. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
affirming the magistrate court's judgment of conviction entered upon its finding 
that Scott was guilty of criminal contempt. 
DATED this 11th day of July, 2013. 
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